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Abstract 
We exploit the forced closure of three segregated primary schools in Amsterdam to establish 
the determinants of school choice of ethnic minority pupils. The schools were closed due to 
mismanagement and poor assessment from the Education Inspectorate. Most of the affected 
students were of socially disadvantaged and non-western migrant background. Our analysis 
contrasts the respective school choice decisions of the ‘early movers’ who had voluntarily 
changed schools within two years before the forced closure and the ‘forced movers’ who had 
to move to other schools after the closure. Using a conditional logit model and a nested logit 
framework, we find that: (i) students of segregated schools tend to re-concentrate into the 
same schools rather than disperse into different schools; (ii) primary school choice is nested 
upon school type; and (iii) the ‘forced movers’ prefer schools with more peers of own (non-
western and low socioeconomic) background, less peer truancy, and shorter residence-to-
school distance. 
 
Keywords: School choice; Ethnic segregation; School closure; School mobility, Nested logit  
 
JEL-classification: I20, I28, R28 
  
                                                     
1 We would like to thank Henriëtte Maassen van den Brink for the very useful comments on an earlier version of 
this paper and the Municipality of Amsterdam for providing the dataset. 
† Corresponding author.  
2 
 
1. Introduction 
How do students select themselves into schools? While this question appears trivial and answerable 
via a simple analysis of the observed school choices in a system of free school choice, it is not due to 
three reasons. First, the observed, aggregated student characteristics of the chosen schools do not 
reveal parental school choice but rather the school composition. While the latter influences and is 
influenced by school choice, it is not equivalent. School composition here is a static concept, while 
school choice is dynamic, subject to student mobility or transitions during the course of education 
(Cameron and Heckman 2001; Declerq and Verboven 2013). Second, focusing on the school choices 
of new students (e.g. students enrolling in the first grade) is not representative. Even in a system of 
free school choice, most schools have an admission policy that allocates the potentially scarce places, 
e.g. based on proximity to residence, sibling’s enrolment, religion, and lottery. This makes it less 
about school choice but more about matching principles (c.f. the student assignment mechanism 
literature by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez 2003; Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2005). Third, students do 
not choose schools randomly. They follow an implicit nested decision-making structure in which the 
school denomination is preferred above other observed school characteristics. Ignoring this nested 
structure would result in biased (or at least, incomplete) evidence.  
 
Exploiting a forced school closure setting, this paper is able to focus on school choice as exogenously 
determined by a policy intervention. In particular, it examines the school choice of students in three 
Amsterdam primary schools that were forced to close in July 2007. The three schools had operated 
under the same school board, the Foundation for Islamic Primary Schools in Amsterdam (Stichting 
Islamitische Basisscholen Amsterdam, SIBA). The primary reason for the closure was the consecutive 
and deemed to be irreversible poor performance assessments by the Education Inspectorate on the 
schools’ finances, management, and educational attainment of students (De Witte and Van Klaveren 
2012; Dijksma 2007). The policy intervention was sudden with most of the affected students de-
enrolling from the schools immediately after the closure and not before. School closures are very rare 
in the Netherlands and in this case, it is the indirect result of the discontinued public funding without 
which the schools were no longer financially viable.  Consequently, our study augments the growing 
research field on school closures and its effects (De Witte and Van Klaveren 2012; Egelund and 
Laustsen 2006; Engberg et al. 2012).  
 
Through school enrolment records, we also extract a sample of ‘early movers’ who had changed 
schools within two years prior to the forced closure to contrast their choice determinants with that of 
the forced movers. The former are students who have self-selected themselves into the three schools 
which were later forced to closed but have exhibited potential ‘Tiebout mobility’, i.e. by leaving the 
weakly assessed schools early for a presumably better school (Tiebout 1956; Hanushek, Kain, and 
Rivkin 2004; Allen, Burgess, and Key 2010; Brunner and Imazeki 2008). Our observations comprise 
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of interschool mobility within the municipality so it is reasonable to assume that the school changes 
for these voluntary movers were more due to choice than to circumstance (e.g. a move out of the city). 
Through the two group comparison, we hope to isolate the actual determinants of school choice given 
an external shock such as forced school closure. The paper is novel in the sense that it studies the 
school choices of involuntary movers which is expected to differ significantly from voluntary school 
choice.  
 
Since the three primary schools are Islamic schools with predominantly students of Moroccan and 
Turkish background, our paper contributes to the under-researched school choice literature for 
students of ethnic minority or migrant background. The increasing ethnic diversification of European 
cities due to immigration has led to substantial research interest in school choice and segregation 
(Allen 2007; Burgess, Wilson, and Lupton 2005; Karsten et al. 2006; Rangvid 2007; Cantillon 2009; 
Denessen, Driessena, and Sleegers 2005; Söderström and Uusitalo 2010). Ethnically diverse, the city 
of Amsterdam makes an interesting case study for the determinants of primary school choice. First, 
with the Netherlands being a relatively new migrant-receiving country, there is significant difference 
in school choice between native Dutch students and those of ‘non-western’ migrant origin. The latter 
typically refers to the four largest ‘non-western’ ethnic groups – Aruban and Dutch Antillean, 
Turkish, Moroccan, and Surinamese – with ethnicity defined by the parents’ country of birth. Next, 
without school catchment conditions and with per capita public funding for almost all schools, the 
Dutch school system approximates a universal voucher system (Friedman 1955; De Haan, Leuven, 
and Oosterbeek 2011) with clear parental choice-driven sorting into schools. Mediating the economic 
factor in school choice, non-socioeconomic school segregation has been sustained as parents choose 
according to other considerations such as religious denomination, educational philosophy, and student 
ethnic composition. The latter’s salience in school choice has been exacerbated by secularisation and 
the growing population of inhabitants with a foreign background (allochtonen) since the 1960s.  
 
More than half of the primary school-attending children in Amsterdam are of non-western origin – 
55.8 per cent in 2007 – yet ethnic composition in schools reflects a far more segregated reality. 
According to the dissimilarity index score in Table 1, 56.6 per cent of the non-western minority 
students in 2007 will need to change schools in order to achieve ethnic evenness at the city-level. The 
dissimilarity index is measured as the cumulative mean deviation in each school between the number 
of non-western pupils, weighted by its city-level population, and the number of native Dutch and 
western pupils, weighted by its city-level population (Duncan and Duncan 1955). Likewise, the 
interactive or exposure index is the cumulative product between the probability of a student being of a 
native Dutch and western background in each school and the probability of a student being of non-
western background in a city (Massey and Denton 1988). The isolation index as the converse of the 
exposure index is measured as the cumulative product between the probabilities of a student being of 
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non-western background in the city and in each school. From both indices, we know that for the 
average non-western minority pupil in Amsterdam, 72.9 per cent of her school peers will be of non-
western background while the remainder 27.1 per cent will be of native Dutch and western 
background. From a policy perspective, our paper’s findings on disaggregated parental school 
preferences are useful for addressing aggregated issues such as school segregation. 
 
Table 1: Ethnic segregation indices for Amsterdam primary schools 
2005 2006 2007 2008 
Isolation Index 0.737 0.732 0.729 0.725 
Exposure Index 0.263 0.268 0.271 0.275 
Dissimilarity Index 0.574 0.571 0.566 0.560 
Source: Municipality of Amsterdam (2005-2011) and CBS (2013). Authors’ 
own calculation based on the Duncan and Duncan dissimilarity index (1955) and 
the isolation and exposure (or interaction) indices from Massey and Denton 
(1988). 
 
We estimate a conditional logit model to exploit the large heterogeneity of primary schools in 
Amsterdam. It includes all school alternatives alongside their characteristics, including match-specific 
information such as residence-to-school distance. Then, we relax the conditional logit’s independence 
of irrelevant alternative assumption by estimating a nested logit model so that the school-specific 
error terms within a ‘nest’ can be correlated with one another. This is crucial given the profile of our 
student sample that have all enrolled in an Islamic school – many of which still exhibited parental 
preference for staying within the Islamic denominational schools after the forced closure (ANP 
2007a). Demand has always exceeded supply in Amsterdam as local studies have found the 
percentage of parents preferring an Islamic denomination school to be 2.5 times that of students 
enrolled in the school type (van Kessel 2000; van Kessel 2003; as quoted in Karsten et al. 2006) 
 
As a summary, our paper’s contributions to the existing literature on school choice are three-fold. 
First, we analyse the forced school closure and its effect on student mobility. Second, via the forced 
school closure and our second sample of ‘early movers’, we compare and contrast the school choices 
of those who had changed schools by choice and those who did so by circumstance, i.e. the forced 
closure. Lastly, we apply a nested logit model to analyse primary school choice as a decision nested 
upon school type or religious denomination. 
 
In the following sections, we review the key literature on the determinants of school choice (Section 
2) and the primary school system in the Netherlands (Section 3), before describing our data (Section 
4), methodology (Section 5) and results (Section 6). A final section concludes with several key 
lessons and a brief policy discussion. 
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2. Literature review  
The following section summarises three main strands of literature relevant to school choice analysis: 
(i) the primary determinants of school choice; (ii) the use of stated preference versus revealed 
preference choice data; and (iii) the various discrete choice methods applied to school choice analysis. 
For brevity of this paper and given our application on the Dutch school system, our review of school 
choice determinants is largely centred on the Netherlands.  
 
One of the main determinants of primary school choice is school type or religious denomination 
(Lankford and Wyckoff 1992; Driessen and Merry 2006; Allen and West 2009). For example, it was 
the main factor behind the 1917 Dutch constitutional reform that finally led to public funding of 
private religious schools (Ritzen, van Dommelen, and De Vijlder 1997). Besides school type, 
proximity or distance between school and residence is also a robust predictor for school choice (Ruijs 
and Oosterbeek 2012; Long 2004; Kelchtermans and Verboven 2010a; Kelchtermans and Verboven 
2010b; Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2005). 
 
Ethnicity matters (Ladd and Fiske 2009; Ladd, Fiske, and Ruijs 2009; Karsten et al. 2003; Karsten et 
al. 2006; Burgess, Wilson, and Lupton 2005; Clotfelter 1999) – much more than most parents are 
willing to admit (Schneider and Buckley 2002; Schneider, Elacqua, and Buckley 2006). The distaste 
for schools with disproportionately more non-western minority students is apparent for both native 
Dutch and non-western parents themselves. Karsten and colleagues (2003) observe that parents 
regardless of ethnic background find predominantly ‘non-white’ schools in the neighbourhood – i.e. 
schools with 23 per cent disproportionately less native Dutch students compared to the four-digit 
postcode area – to be ‘unsuitable’. It is also equally possible that ethnicity functions merely as a 
heuristic to parents for student ability, parental resources, and even teacher quality. With regards to 
the latter, schools with more disadvantaged or minority pupils could have difficulty attracting high 
quality teachers (Boyd et al. 2005; Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2005; Jacob and Lefgren 2007). The 
disproportionately higher vacancy rates in schools with high share of non-western minority pupils 
coincides with the previous observation (Karsten et al. 2006; Ladd and Fiske 2009). In addition, the 
strong correlation between non-western background and low parental education could lead parents to 
proxy school peers’ parental resources with share of non-western pupils. There is also the ‘familiarity’ 
aspect as students have been found to ‘herd’ together with fellow primary school peers when selecting 
secondary schools (Ruijs and Oosterbeek 2012). 
 
Exploiting discontinuity at school district boundaries, Black (1999) estimates a 2.1 per cent higher 
willingness-to-pay by parents for one standard deviation increase in school test scores. Lower school 
quality has also been found to increase the probability on parental decision to exit charter schools, 
more than regular public schools (Hanushek et al. 2007). School quality matters in the Netherlands as 
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well (Koning and van der Wiel 2013) but one study in Amsterdam using first preference school 
choice exposed some inconsistencies of this predictor (Ruijs and Oosterbeek 2012), i.e. some of the 
school quality indicators were found to have either no effect or negative effect on school choice. 
Guided by previous literature, we aim to reduce the potential omitted variable bias in our empirical 
analysis by incorporating all the possible determinants of school choice. 
 
As a second line of earlier literature on school choice, stated preference studies tend to overestimate 
the importance of education quality over other factors such as racial and class peer composition 
(Schneider and Buckley 2002; Schneider, Elacqua, and Buckley 2006). In contrast, revealed 
preference research (see for instance Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2005; Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan 
2007) accounts for: (i) the bias of survey respondents towards ‘socially accepted’ answers, (ii) the 
‘bundling’ nature of school characteristics that needs to be trade-off with one another, and (iii) the 
constraints of regulation (e.g. catchment area) and school admission policies on parental choice. It is 
indeed a challenge for choice analysts to determine valid attributes that do influence choice selection 
because they are perceived subjectively by the decision-makers  (Hensher, Rose, and Greene 2005). 
This is the main disadvantage of collecting revealed preference data from marketplace data such as 
school administrative records and not, for instance, from the parents as decision-makers. 
 
A third line of literature considers school choice as a discrete choice problem. Random utility models 
(RUM), first introduced by McFadden (1973) with extensions by Ben-Akiva (1974),  Williams 
(1977), Daly and Zachary (1978), and McFadden (1978) are popular in the school choice literature. 
Due to the higher computational demands of the conditional logit, multinomial logit models have been 
favoured in earlier studies (e.g. Manski and Wise 1983)2. Nonetheless, the latter can forsake key 
information by aggregating alternative-specific attributes while focusing more on the characteristics 
of the decision-maker that influences choice (Long 2004). Conditional logit models let the alternative-
specific attributes to dictate choice. It also allows for pair-wise combined information between 
individual-specific attribute and alternative-specific attribute, such as residence-to-school distance, 
which is crucial for our study on primary school choice. As an extension of the conditional logit, 
nested logit models are common in the choice literature for tertiary education since it can account for 
the prior decision of whether or not to pursue post-compulsory education (Montgomery 2002; 
Kelchtermans and Verboven 2010a) – although the prevalence of the nested logit model with the ‘not 
attend’ option over the conditional logit model is contested by Long (2004). The mixed logit model is 
also an extension of the conditional logit model which, like the nested logit, relaxes the assumption of 
                                                     
2 Random sampling of alternatives of the choice set (including the chosen alternative) is also a method to deal 
with the computational demands of the conditional logit estimations (Kelchtermans and Verboven 2010b; Kohn, 
Mansk, and Mundel 1976) and its nested logit extension (Montgomery 2002). See also the seminal paper by 
McFadden (1973). 
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independence of irrelevant alternatives (Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2005; Ruijs and Oosterbeek 
2012).  
 
3. School choice in the Netherlands 
The Dutch school system places a strong emphasis on free parental choice of schools (Dronkers 1995; 
Karsten et al. 2003; Ladd, Fiske, and Ruijs 2009). The decentralised school system in the Netherlands 
resembles a ‘quasi-market’ (Le Grand 1991) with public funding and private production of school 
services. Public funding of schools is allocated per capita with additional weights assigned based on 
parental education level. Schools with less than nine per cent students in need of additional weighting 
are not provided more than per capita funding. 
 
Primary education is part of the compulsory education for all children between the ages of 5 and 16. 
Typically, a student begins primary school education from age 4 although the enrolment process starts 
much earlier, e.g. from the age of 2 in some Amsterdam schools (Gemeente Amsterdam 2013). 
Enrolment and admission policies are decentralised at the school-level although since 2009, there has 
been a trend for some schools in the same district towards harmonization.3 Some religious schools 
have a religious admission criterion. While students are not bound to their residential neighbourhood 
schools – i.e. no ‘catchment area’ like in the United Kingdom – schools can give priority to children 
living in the school’s neighbourhood. Other priority rules in school admission include having siblings 
who are enrolled in the school, children of the school’s employees, and the attendance of similar pre-
school education type. The more popular, oversubscribed schools also allocate placements by lottery. 
Lastly, unlike the United States, homeschooling is virtually non-existent in the Netherlands (Blok 
2004). 
 
While the Education Inspectorate reports and the national standardised test scores for schools are 
publically available, the municipality has been working towards greater transparency. Since 2011, the 
Municipality of Amsterdam has, in cooperation of the local school boards, published annual school 
quality indicator reports for all primary schools which include learning skill- and subject-based test 
scores, quality assessment from the Education Inspectorate, turnover rate, student socioeconomic 
composition, and type of secondary school stream recommendations (Gemeente Amsterdam 2011). 
The report allows for the direct comparison of schools and was aimed to improve the information 
asymmetry and efficiency of parental choice based on quality indicators. Similar information have 
been made publically available much earlier, from the 1990s, to guide secondary school choice (Ruijs 
and Oosterbeek 2012). 
 
                                                     
3 After several successful pilot projects, a centralised system at the municipality-level is underway (Gemeente 
Amsterdam and Amsterdamse Schoolbesturen Primair Onderwijs 2013). 
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Choice within school closure 
Primary school choice, however, is not limited to the first round of enrolment and is often a repeated 
decision-making event due to intentional or circumstantial school mobility (Alexander, Entwisle, and 
Dauber 1996; Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin 2004; Allen, Burgess, and Key 2010). School mobility 
permits revealed preference choice analysis of new school choices and is more prevalent among non-
western minority students in Amsterdam (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Mobility between primary schools in column percentages (2000-2008), Amsterdam 
# School 
Changes 
Native 
Dutch 
Moroccan Antillean-
Aruban 
Surinamese Turkish Other 
Non-west 
Western Total 
0 70.95 53.31 50.09 50.63 51.30 55.57 65.32 59.93 
1 21.47 32.36 30.69 31.58 34.19 31.38 24.80 27.93 
2 5.45 10.36 12.73 12.20 10.88 9.35 7.06 8.67 
3 1.49 2.82 4.15 3.84 2.74 2.59 1.87 2.43 
4 or more 0.64 1.15 2.35 1.75 0.89 1.10 0.95 1.04 
Total 17,383 9,257 1,108 7,393 5,283 5,742 3,682 49,848 
Source: Ong and De Witte (2013). ‘Mobility’ refers to move between schools (at the locational-level) 
offering standard primary education without correction for the merging, division or dissolution of schools.  
 
Given the limitation of our data, we do not observe schools’ admission policies, i.e. the supply-side 
constraints that affect school choice. Karsten et al. (2003), for instance, discuss gate-keeping measures 
taken by the schools during enrolment process. It is reasonable, however, to expect potential receiving 
schools to be open to small numbers of enrolment. More so with the mediation of the municipality 
that had assisted the displaced students with their relocation into other schools (personal 
communication, 2013). For the purpose of this paper, we make the strong but justifiable assumption 
that the students were unconstrained in school choice in contrast to the initial school enrolment when 
students were matched to schools based on the priority rules as previously discussed. Even so, 
approximately 500 out of the 600 students affected had chosen to move en bloc to one school under 
the same school board (Inspectie van het Onderwijs 2009). This was an unexpected outcome of the 
policy intervention – to the disapproval of the then State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science 
who was in favour of integrating the students into other, less insular schools (ANP 2007b). 
Temporarily, the students were allowed to stay in the same school buildings.4 Nonetheless, there had 
been a complete change in school management, teachers, and other personnel.  
 
4. Data description 
For our study, we exploit school enrolment records provided by the Municipality of Amsterdam for 
the school years from 2005/2006 until 2010/2011. As many as 55,110 primary school students were 
enrolled in Amsterdam in July 2007. Between July 2005 and July 2007 when the forced closures took 
                                                     
4 The larger two schools were renamed – El Faroeq Omar school became IBS As-Siddieq (Zeeburg) and At 
Taqwa school became IBS As-Siddieq (Noord) –  and retained at original locations while students from the 
smaller Abraham El Khaliel school were absorbed by the other schools, including the original IBS As-Siddieq 
(De Baarsjes) school-location.  
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place, 665 students had been enrolled at least once in one of the three closed schools and had moved 
to another primary school within the municipality. For our final discrete choice analyses, observations 
with missing values in the battery of explanatory variables were excluded, leaving us with the final 
sample of 623 observations.  
 
School alternatives in this paper refer to schools at the locational level, i.e. a school with two separate 
locations will be considered as two school alternatives. Altogether, there are 206 primary school 
alternatives across the years but the number varies between the years due to school closures and 
missing values in the covariates. The analysis were conducted separately for the two samples: the 
‘early movers’ who had voluntarily changed schools within two years before the forced closure and 
the ‘forced movers’ who had to move to other schools after the closure. The latter group comprised a 
large subset of students who had collectively moved into one school that is managed by the same 
school board (Inspectie van het Onderwijs 2009). Although officially, 600 students were affected by 
the school closure, we only observe 486 of the ‘forced movers’ in our dataset as we focus exclusively 
on moves within the municipality and we exclude students who have since transitioned into secondary 
education. ‘Early movers’ comprise of 220 students who had changed schools within the municipality 
between July 2005 and June 2007. 
 
In the selection of variables for the choice model, it is crucial to only include independent school 
attributes that actually differentiate the school alternatives from one another in the eyes of the parents 
as decision-makers (McFadden 1973). The dataset contains student-level covariates – ethnicity, 
residential postcode, and unauthorised absenteeism experience (truancy). Individual-level information 
is used to calculate aggregated school-level variables such as population size, peer ethnicity, and 
truancy rate. Meanwhile, Haversine-based distance from residence to potential schools is estimated 
via longitudinal and latitudinal information at the four-position postcode-level. Due to outliers, we cap 
our distance-to-school variable at 10 kilometres. 5  We were also provided test scores from the 
standardised national test (Cito) by the municipality but due to the lack of variation between schools 
(see Table 3), including this covariate did not alter much of our discrete choice analysis results.  
 
Additionally, we have information on school type (i.e. teaching philosophy or religious denomination) 
and students’ socio-economic status composition as measured by 2009 6  data on school funding 
                                                     
5 Only 4.2 per cent of the students in our sample attend a school that is more than 10 kilometres away from their 
residence. 
6 Unfortunately, the pre-2009 student weight data is unsuitable for our purpose due to the Ministry of 
Education’s gradual implementation of new student weight definitions between 2006 and 2009 (Ministerie van 
Onderwijs Cultuur en Wetenschap 2013). Up until 2006, additional weights were assigned by: 0.25 for native 
Dutch students with both parents having a maximum of lower vocational-level education; 0.40 for children of 
shipping crewmembers living away from the family; 0.70 for caravan-dwelling students; and 0.90 for first- and 
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weights for socially disadvantaged students. The latter pertains to public funding of schools which is 
allocated per capita and with additional weights assigned: 1.20 for students with at least one parent 
possessing primary-level education only; 0.30 for students with both parents (or the parent in-charge 
for primary care) having a maximum of lower vocational-level education (Rijksoverheid 2013). Given 
the large positive correlation between peer ‘non-western’ background and peer socioeconomic status 
as proxied by parental education (Pearson’s product moment correlation = 0.86, p-value<0.000 for the 
very low education level, and 0.64, p-value<0.000 for the low education level), including both 
variables helps separate peer socioeconomic status from peer ethnicity when influencing school 
choice. Since additional funding is provided to schools with high proportion of socially disadvantaged 
pupils, we also include school personnel information to proxy for level of school resources. The 
earliest data provided by the Ministry of Education (Dienst Uitvoering Onderwijs, DUO) pertains to 
year 2008. We assume that both data on school funding weights and school staff (in fulltime 
equivalent) numbers did not fluctuate much between the years 2005 and 2008/2009. As a sensitivity 
analysis, the analysis was repeated with 2006 student weight data that only partially measures the 
proportion of low socioeconomic status students and the results were comparable7 except for the 
variable for peers with very low socioeconomic status. 
 
More than half of the students in our dataset are of Moroccan descent while a quarter of them are of 
Turkish descent. The non-significant chi-square test of association between student ethnicity and 
moving status indicates the relative similarity between the subgroups. Proximity is crucial as 90 per 
cent of them choose to attend a school that is within 500 metre away from their residences. In the 
bivariate table presented in Table 3, we compare the average student and receiving school 
characteristics of the two groups (and its subgroups) within our sample. It is apparent that students 
who chose to move en bloc to one school tend to live the closest to their new school while the 
potentially more selective early movers had moved to schools that are located further away. Truancy 
seems to be less of an issue for the early movers. Interestingly, truancy behaviour is more visible 
among those who did not move en bloc to the same school after the forced closure as nearly one out 
of five students have reported unauthorised absenteeism experience.  
 
The vast majority (83 per cent) of the forced movers had moved into an Islamic school while the 
distribution across the three school denominations is roughly equal amongst the early movers. There 
are 10 percentage-points more non-western peers in the receiving school for the forced movers than 
for the ‘early movers’ – this difference is largely driven by the main receiving school for the forced 
movers with a high 93 per cent non-western student population. In contrast, forced movers who had 
                                                                                                                                                                     
second-generation immigrants with at least one parent with a maximum lower vocational-level education or is 
unemployed, or the highest earning parent working in the manual or unskilled sector (Ladd and Fiske 2009). 
7 This set of results is available upon request. 
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moved to other schools ended up in schools with lower share of non-western peers and higher share of 
native Dutch and western peers. On the one hand, early movers appear more selective towards more 
native Dutch and western minority peers, smaller school size, lower truancy rate, and the higher level 
of school resources (as measured by the managerial and teaching staff-to-student ratio). On the other 
hand, forced movers emerge to be more selective towards schools with higher average test score and 
lower proportion of students with low parental education background (as measured by the 0.3 student 
funding weight).  
 
With its relatively large student population, the main receiving school for the forced movers has a 
significantly smaller managerial and teaching staff-to-student ratio compared to the average receiving 
schools chosen by the other students. Potentially, the low teacher-to-student ratio is compensated by 
its relative high proportion of support and administrative personnel. Those who chose to move to this 
school have the average shortest residence-to-school distance which could indicate a potential trade-
off between the school characteristics. The subsequent section with the conditional logit and nested 
logit explanatory models could shed light on this possibility. 
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Table 3: Distribution of student and receiving school characteristics by moving status 
 Early Movers Forced Movers 
  All All SIBA School 
Other  
schools 
Student characteristics 
Ethnicity (%) 
    Native Dutch 2.3 2.7 2.5 3.6 
    Moroccan 60.0 58.9 61.0 48.8 
    Turkish 16.4 22.0 19.9 32.1 
    Surinamese 1.8 1.9 2.0 1.2 
    Antillean/Aruban 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
    Other non-western 17.3 11.5 11.2 13.1 
    Western 2.3 2.7 3.0 1.2 
With absenteeism experience (%)  5.0 12.1 10.7 19.1 
Distance (in kilometre) 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.5 
School characteristics 
School type (%) 
    Public 37.7 9.7 0.0 56.0 
    Islamic 27.7 82.9 100.0 1.2 
    Christian 34.6 7.4 0.0 42.9 
Peer ethnicity (%) 
    Non-western 80.5 90.4 93.0 78.0 
        Moroccan 39.9 46.2 49.5 29.7 
        Turkish 15.2 24.6 26.6 14.8 
        Surinamese 10.0 2.9 0.5 15.1 
        Other non-western 14.6 16.4 16.4 16.6 
    Native Dutch 14.5 4.2 1.6 17.0 
    Western 4.2 3.5 3.3 4.7 
Peer socioeconomic status (%) 
    Low SES (0.3 weight) 11.2 7.6 6.1 14.9 
    Very low SES (1.2 weight) 35.2 37.3 37.8 34.6 
Number of FTE staff per 100 student
    Management 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.7 
    Teaching 7.5 6.1 6.0 6.8 
    Support/Administrative 2.3 2.5 2.7 1.8 
School size 234.8 398.5 428.0 253.6 
Truancy (%) 13.7 15.6 15.7 15.6 
Average test score 534.9 535.5 535.6 535.2 
Sample size* 220 486 402 84 
Source: Authors’ own calculations with combined data from Municipality of Amsterdam (2005-
2011), MINOCW (2009), DUO (2007-2008). Receiving school variables refer to 2005 with the 
exceptions of socioeconomic status (2009), test scores (2007/08), and school personnel (2008). 
Bold estimates indicate statistical significant difference at the 5% level between: (i) the early 
movers and (all) last movers; and (ii) among the forced movers, the SIBA-school and other 
schools. *Maximum sample size which does not account for missing values on covariates. 
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5. Methodology 
5.1. Intuition behind the conditional and nested logit framework 
Each school within the municipality of Amsterdam is considered to be a different school alternative. 
Given that we do not fully observe school mobility outside of Amsterdam, our analysis includes only 
intra-city mobility and does not include an ‘out of Amsterdam’ alternative. Due to the large set of 
differentiable school choice alternatives (i.e. 206 different schools), a parent’s choice of primary 
school for their child8 is estimated using a conditional logit model.  
 
While its estimates report the likelihood of selecting a school with a given set of observed 
characteristics, the conditional logit model suffers from one major drawback – it does not allow for 
different substitutability or complementarity between alternatives with its assumption of independent 
and irrelevant alternatives (IIA). In our case, it is intuitive to see that when an Islamic school 
alternative is removed from or added to the choice set, the probability of selecting another Islamic 
school alternative changes disproportionally more than the probability of selecting a Public or 
Christian school alternative.  
 
The mixed logit relaxes the assumption and allows for heterogeneous preferences for school 
characteristics but its lack of closed form solution creates computational limitations which we deem to 
be unnecessary for our relatively homogeneous student sample. Instead, the IIA assumption is relaxed 
in our study by means of a nested logit model which allows for the alternative-specific error terms 
within a ‘branch’ or ‘nest’ to be correlated with one another. The nested model does not imply a 
sequential decision-making process but it can be interpreted as such: parents as decision-makers 
prioritise the choice of school type or denomination before selecting schools within the school type 
based on a set of school attributes. To our best knowledge, our study is the first in applying a nested 
logit model to examine compulsory primary school choice that is nested within school type or 
religious denomination. Besides the composition of our unique sample of students enrolled in Islamic 
schools, we argue that parental choice for primary school is intuitively nested in the choice for school 
type. The failure to account for the decision’s nesting structure would otherwise bias our choice 
estimates. 
 
Even so, the main disadvantage of the nested logit model when compared to the conditional logit 
model is that the latter permits the estimation of the effect of school type as a choice determinant. It is 
also a useful comparison should either one of the nested logit models for our two sample groups be 
misspecified, i.e. that school choice is not nested on school type. Therefore, we estimate both the 
conditional logit and the nested logit probabilities of school choice for: (i) the ‘early movers’ who had 
                                                     
8 In our paper, we assume that school choice is made by the parents of the student and/or the student and use 
both terms interchangeably. 
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changed schools within two years before the forced closure in July 2007; and (ii) the ‘forced movers’ 
who were forced to change schools after the forced closure (see Figure 1). Within a two-level nested 
logit model with school denomination as the nesting factor, the early movers can choose between 
three school types: public, Islamic, and Christian. We include school alternatives from other religious 
denominations in the last group, but since none of the non-Christian religious schools were selected 
by our sample, we can effectively consider this nest to be ‘Christian’. In view of the small proportion 
of forced movers selecting non-Islamic schools (17 per cent), we only distinguish between those who 
had chosen the same Islamic school denomination, and those who had chosen ‘non-Islamic’ school 
types. 
 
Except for one student, all of the forced movers who had chosen an Islamic receiving school had 
moved en bloc to the same school – a policy outcome that contradicts the initial aim and policy line of 
the Ministry of Education. Conceptually, we can interpret the nesting structure to be one of 
reconcentration-versus-dispersal behaviour by the students. The nesting structure is also consistent 
with the reality that most parents of the students from the closed schools were in favour of moving 
into an Islamic school instead of a non-Islamic school (as reported by ANP 2007a).  
 
Figure 1: Nested logit model of school choice for the early movers and forced movers 
 
    
Note: Number of observations includes those with missing values on some covariates. 
 
 
  
School alternatives, j
School type, k
Early movers (N = 220) School choice
Public
(38%)
School1 ......
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School1 ......
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Forced movers (N = 486) School Choice
Non-Islamic
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School1 School2 ........
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5.2. School choice model 
The intuitive description of Subsection 4.1 is formalised below to give a more precise description of 
school choice. 
 
Conditional logit model 
Let the utility that a parent, n, derives from choosing school alternative, j (1, …, J) to be ܷ௡௝ (we 
follow the notations as in Train 2003). Since we do not observe all factors that can influence one's 
utility in choosing school j, we define ௡ܸ௝ as the part of utility derived by parent n  that is observable 
to the researcher and ߝ௡௝ to be the random error term that captures the unobserved factors affecting 
utility:  
ܷ௡௝ ൌ ௡ܸ௝ ൅ ߝ௡௝ . 
Under the assumption of utility maximisation, the parent will choose the school that will offer the 
highest utility. By choosing school i, the derived utility must be higher than the utility offered by all 
other school alternatives, ௜ܷ ൐ ௝ܷ ׊ ݆ ് ݅ . By assuming the error term ߝ௡௝  to be independent and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.) with extreme value distribution and utility as linearly additive, the 
random utility model can be conveniently estimated with the standard logit model (c.f. McFadden 
1973). Under the logit model, school choice is defined as a logit choice probability (expressed in its 
variance-scaled form) of parent n choosing school i, 
௡ܲ௜ ൌ ݁
ఉᇲ௫೙೔
∑ ݁ఉᇲ௫೙ೕ௝
 
where ௡ܸ௝ ൌ ߚԢݔ௡௝ and ݔ௡௝ represents the vector of observable characteristics of school alternative j 
that affect utility of parent n. The estimated β coefficients measure the actual effect of each observed 
variable scaled to the variance of the unobservables. And so the interpretation of individual β 
coefficients should account for the fact that a lower coefficient does not necessarily indicate a smaller 
effect as it could be due to larger variance of the unobservables (Train 2003).   
 
Nested logit model 
As elaborated previously, a nested logit model that relaxes the assumption of proportional substitution 
between school denominations seems more appropriate for our study. Analogous to the previous 
model, if we now assume school alternatives j to be separable into K number of non-overlapping 
‘nests’ (or school denomination in our case), ܤ௞ , the utility of parent n choosing school j can be 
decomposed into three parts: 
ܷ௡௝ ൌ ௡ܹ௞ ൅ ௡ܻ௝ ൅ ߝ௡௝ 
for ݆ א ܤ௞ where ௡ܹ௞ is the observable utility component common to all school alternatives in nest 
ܤ௞, ௡ܻ௝ denotes the observable utility component specific to each school j within nest ܤ௞ and ߝ௡௝ is 
the idiosyncratic error term (Train 2003). 
16 
 
 
The probability for parent n to choose school i in nest ܤ௞ can be expressed as the product of the 
marginal probability of parent n choosing an alternative within nest ܤ௞ , ௡ܲ஻ೖ  and the conditional 
probability of parent n choosing school i in nest ܤ௞ conditional on choosing an alternative in nest ܤ௞, 
௡ܲ௜|஻ೖ: 
௡ܲ௜ ൌ  ௡ܲ௜|஻ೖ ௡ܲ஻ೖ. 
Employing the generalised extreme value (GEV) distribution of the error term ߝ௡௝  (c.f. McFadden 
1978; Williams 1977; Daly and Zachary 1978), the probability for parent n to choose school i in nest 
ܤ௞ can estimated by a utility maximisation-consistent nested logit model. Under the nested logit, the 
i.i.d. condition still holds between the error terms of school alternatives in different nests:  
ܿ݋ݒ൫ߝ௡௝, ߝ௡௠൯ ൌ 0 if ݆ א ܤ௞ and ݉ א ܤ௟ with ݈ ് ݇. 
But the error terms of different alternatives within the same nest are now allowed to be correlated: 
ܿ݋ݒ൫ߝ௡௝, ߝ௡௛൯ ് 0 if  ݆, ݄ א ܤ௞ . 
 
To estimate random utility model-consistent choice probabilities given the correlated error terms 
within a nest, the observable utility component specific to each school j within each nest, ௡ܻ௝ needs to 
be normalised. This can be done via rescaling by the inverse of nest ܤ௞’s dissimilarity parameter, ߣ௞ 
(we refer to the elaboration by Heiss 2002). Furthermore, this normalisation allows for the 
comparability across nests. Similar to the conditional logit before, the j school alternative-specific 
(rescaled) utility derived by parent n is estimated by a vector of observed school characteristics, ݔ௡௝: 
௡ܻ௝/ߣ௞ ൌ ߚԢݔ௡௝ . While the nest-specific utility, ௡ܹ௞  can be estimated by a vector of observable 
factors, ݖ௡௞ common to all alternatives within each nest, ܤ௞: ௡ܹ௞ ൌ ߛᇱݖ௡௞. Hence, the corresponding 
marginal and conditional probability logit models: 
௡ܲ஻ೖ ൌ
݁ఊᇲ௭೙ೖାఒೖூ೙ೖ
∑ ݁ఊᇲ௭೙೗ାఒೖூ೙೗௄௟ୀଵ
 
௡ܲ௜|஻ೖ ൌ
݁ఉᇲ௫೙೔
∑ ݁ఉᇲ௫೙ೕ௝א஻ೖ
 
where the inclusive value, ܫ௡௞ is the log of the denominator of the conditional logit probability model 
that links the two logit probabilities: 
      ܫ௡௞ ൌ ln ∑ ݁ఉᇲ௫೙ೕ௝א஻ೖ . 
 
Due to lack of information on the nest-specific factors, the ݖ௡௞ vector is not estimated in this paper. 
Instead we only estimate, in addition to the alternative-specific utility, the overall utility a parent n 
derives from ‘being able to choose the best alternative in the nest’ which is equivalent to the inclusive 
value, ߣ௞ܫ௡௞  (Train 2003). In our application, the nested logit model estimates the following logit 
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choice probability of parent n choosing primary school i given that they choose school denomination 
ܤ௞: 
௡ܲ௜ ൌ ቆ ௘
ഁᇲೣ೙೔
∑ ௘ഁᇲೣ೙ೕೕאಳೖ
ቇ ൬ ௘ഊೖ಺೙ೖ∑ ௘ഊ೗಺೙೗೗಼సభ ൰. 
From this equation, it is apparent that the IIA condition with proportional substitution across 
alternatives still holds within each ‘nest’ or school type, but not between ‘nests’. 
 
Following Heiss (2002), we specify the coefficient of the inclusive value, λk (also known as 
dissimilarity parameter) to be equal to ඥ1 െ ߩ௞ with ߩ௞ measuring the correlation between the error 
terms of all alternatives within nest ܤ௞. By this definition, a dissimilarity parameter value that is close 
to unity indicates more independence while a value close to zero suggests dependence or higher 
correlation between the unobserved utility components of the alternatives within nest ܤ௞.  
 
6. Determinants of primary school choice 
The results of the conditional and nested logit estimates are presented in Table 4. As the results are 
complementary, we will discuss them simultaneously. The conditional logit and nested logit estimates 
concur with our expectation that, all things equal, peer ethnicity matters when it comes to primary 
school choice. Both the early movers and forced movers prefer schools with more non-western peers 
– every percentage point increase in non-western minority peers is associated with a 2 per cent 
increase in odds of school choice for an early mover and 7 per cent increase in odds of school choice 
for a forced mover (as derived from e0.02 and e0.07 respectively). It is also much more pronounced in 
the nested logit model for forced movers when school choice is first nested on school denomination. 
Here, a one percentage point increase in non-western peers increases the odds of school choice by 14 
per cent, all else held constant. It is worth noting that our selected sample comprised of students who 
had enrolled themselves into ethnically segregated Islamic schools hence our estimates are not 
generalizable to the rest of the student population. We also cannot rule out the possibility that peer 
ethnicity is used merely as a heuristic device for parents to assess the school’s overall student ability, 
parental resources, and teacher quality.  
 
While peer ethnicity is an unambiguous determinant of school choice, peer socioeconomic 
composition has a mixed effect on school choice. First, early movers appear to be indifferent towards 
a school’s proportion of students from socially disadvantaged background. Next, the effect of peer 
socioeconomic composition on the school choices of forced movers changes sign from negative to 
positive once school choice is defined to be nested on school type. The contradicting findings 
highlight the potential bias that arises when the appropriate nesting structure is not applied to a 
conditional logit model. All things equal, every percentage point increase in students of ‘low’ and 
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‘very low’ parental education background increases the likelihood of a forced mover selecting a 
school by 23 and 16 per cent, respectively. 
 
For every one percentage-point increase in peer truancy rate, the likelihoods of selecting a school for 
the early movers and forced movers decrease by 4 per cent and 15 per cent respectively. Truancy here 
is measured by the proportion of students in the receiving school with unauthorised absenteeism 
experience. Distance between residence and school remains a robust determinant of school choice for 
both groups as parents prefer primary schools that are closer to home. When primary school choice is 
nested on school denomination, distance becomes a stronger determinant for the forced movers as 
every kilometre in additional distance reduces the odds of selecting a school by 76 per cent.  
 
School size matters only to the forced movers as the likelihood of choosing a school increases by 2 
per cent for every additional student. Controlling for school size and other factors, the early movers 
tend to choose schools with fewer teaching staff, while the forced movers appear to be indifferent 
towards it in the nested logit model. To explain the counter-intuitive finding, we allude to the fact that 
we have not controlled for teaching quality and other likely sources of unobserved heterogeneity 
(Boyd et al. 2005; Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2005). In addition, the weighted student funding 
structure with its nine-per cent threshold has been acknowledged for its positive bias towards schools 
with more disadvantaged students by providing additional resources commonly used to hire additional 
personnel (Ladd and Fiske 2009). A survey of primary school principals in the Netherlands in 1992 
positively correlates school size with the probability of having one full-time school director (De Haan, 
Leuven, and Oosterbeek 2011) – a factor that could improve overall school management and quality.   
 
A consistent predictor for the forced movers, the number of support and administrative staff increases 
the likelihood of choosing a school by a factor of 3 for every additional personnel. Following our 
earlier hypothesis of students preferring larger schools for more managerial personnel, the number of 
managerial personnel has contrary effects on the early movers and forced movers. The former have a 
slight preference for schools with more managerial staff while the reverse is true for the latter. We 
posit two explanations for the forced movers’ ‘distaste’ in this: (i) parents trade off school 
characteristics in selecting primary schools and the benefits of being in, for instance, an Islamic 
school, overrides the cost of not having a full-time school director; (ii) although all school personnel 
information is publically available, school management is potentially less visible to parents and could 
be overlooked in their decision-making process. 
 
From the conditional logit models, it is evident that both the early movers and forced movers do not 
distinguish between public and non-Islamic religious schools. This is not the case for Islamic schools 
– the likelihood of choosing one for the forced movers is 2.9 times the likelihood of choosing a public 
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school, all else held constant. For the ‘early mover’ sample, importance of school type as a predictor 
depends on the model’s battery of covariates since some schools – most notably, the three closed 
schools – are no longer observed in 2008/2009 on the school personnel and student weight funding 
variables (see Table A in the Appendix). There is substantial interschool mobility between the three 
closed schools prior to the forced closure in 2007: 50 out of 209 observations within two years before 
the closure. A school’s Islamic denomination is a statistically significant determinant of school choice 
for the ‘early mover’ sample only when we account for mobility between the three Islamic schools 
(see Table 4 and Table A in the Appendix). 
 
Nevertheless, the rejection of the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption within the school 
denomination branch(es) for both nested logit models justifies its use over the conditional logit. The 
null hypothesis of this likelihood ratio test defines all the dissimilarity parameters in the nested logit 
model to be equal to one, ߣ௞ ൌ 1׊݇. If that were to be true, the model collapses into a standard 
conditional logit model. For the forced movers, the estimated dissimilarity parameter for the Islamic 
denomination schools of 0.143 corresponds to a very high correlation – approximately 0.9794 –
between the error terms of the school alternatives9. 
 
 
  
                                                     
9 We note that for both models, at least one of the dissimilarity parameters had a value exceeding unity which 
violates the global utility maximization assumption under the additive random utility model (Hensher, Rose, and 
Greene 2005). In any case, large dissimilarity parameters are prevalent in the discrete choice literature and we 
argue that our model could still be locally consistent under utility maximization, i.e. for a subset of alternatives 
in each nest, or for a constrained range of all possible values of our covariates (for further discussion on the 
issue we refer to the works of Börsch-Supan 1990; Davis, Gallego, and Topaloglu 2012; Train 2003).  
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Table 4: Conditional and nested logit estimates by moving status 
   Conditional Logit Nested Logit 
   Early leavers 
Forced 
movers 
Early 
leavers 
Forced 
movers 
School denomination 
Public (reference) 
Islamic 0.55 1.04** 
(0.42) (0.43) 
Christian 0.26 0.03 
(0.17) (0.27) 
School size 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.02** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Truancy rate (%) -0.03** -0.05*** -0.04* -0.16** 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) 
Non-western peers (%) 0.02*** 0.07*** 0.02** 0.13*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) 
Low SES peers (%) -0.02 -0.06*** -0.01 0.21** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.10) 
Very low SES peers (%) 0.02* -0.03*** 0.02 0.15** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) 
Number of managerial staff (FTE) 0.21 -0.23 0.34* -3.55*** 
(0.14) (0.18) (0.20) (1.20) 
Number of teaching staff  (FTE) -0.05*** 0.07*** -0.07** 0.14 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.10) 
Number of support staff (FTE) 0.05** 0.12*** 0.03 1.10*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.29) 
Distance-to-residence (km) -0.49*** -0.52*** -0.59*** -1.43*** 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.21) (0.29) 
Log Likelihood -761.563 -646.749 -758.673 -578.678 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 1545.126 1315.499 1541.346 1179.356 
Reject IIA assumption within nests yes yes 
Number of cases 160 463 160 463 
Number of schools 195 196 195 196 
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.Aggregated variables on receiving school refer to 2005 for the 
‘early movers’ and 2006 for the ‘forced movers’. For all samples, we use 2009 weighted student 
funding data on parental education, 2007/2008 CITO test scores, and 2008 school personnel data.  
Number of observations and school alternatives used in the analyses exclude those with missing values 
in any of the explanatory variables. Using the likelihood ratio chi-square test, we reject the null 
hypothesis of IIA within nests at the five per cent significance level with p=0.030 for the ‘early movers’ 
sample and p<0.000 for the ‘forced movers’ sample.
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Robustness checks 
Since the likelihood ratio test in the nested logit model could be susceptible to the tree structure, the 
alternative Hausman-McFadden test is usually performed first on the conditional logit model to 
determine the necessity of a nested logit model (Hensher, Rose, and Greene 2005). The test’s null 
hypothesis of IIA is rejected for the conditional logit model of the ‘forced mover’ sample (χ2= 139.35, 
p-value<0.000), i.e. removing one or a subset of alternatives does have a statistically considerable 
effect on the conditional logit estimates.  
 
As mentioned before, there is substantial interschool mobility between the three schools prior to the 
forced closure. For the ‘early mover’ sample, the Hausman-McFadden null hypothesis is rejected for 
the ‘early mover’ conditional logit model when these interschool mobility observations are included 
(χ2= 25.51, p-value=0.008) but not when they are excluded. To account for the effects of the 
additional school personnel covariates, we have re-estimated the model without these covariates for 
the ‘early mover’ sample with and without interschool mobility between the three closed schools 
(using 2006 student weight data that partially observes peer socioeconomic composition). The 
comparability of results leads us to conclude that school choice is indeed subject to school type or 
denomination although we cannot ascertain if the nested logit framework (especially under the current 
three-category nesting structure) is necessary for the ‘early mover’ sample. 
 
7. Conclusion and policy implications 
This paper exploits the forced closure of primary schools to examine the school choice of students in 
three segregated Amsterdam schools. While the school closure was caused by the schools’ poor 
performance and administrative mismanagement, the selected schools comprised of students from 
predominantly non-western minority and disadvantaged background. The vast majority of the students 
who were forced to change schools chose to move en bloc to one school – an unintended and 
undesired policy outcome. Our study seeks to tease out the reasons underlying these school choices.  
 
Despite the limited interpretation of our results to a specific student subpopulation, they contribute to 
the under-researched school choice literature for minority students in Western Europe. Quite 
intuitively given our select sample, school choice is nested in the choice for school type or religious 
denomination. Failure to account for the nesting structure in decision-making will lead to biased 
estimates, e.g. for peer socioeconomic composition. Besides the appropriate use of the school 
denomination nesting structure for the ‘forced mover’ sample, we also observe high student mobility 
between these three religious schools among the early movers. Like the forced movers, the voluntary 
movers prefer schools with more non-western students, less truancy behaviour among peers, and 
shorter distances from home. But unlike them, they do not retain a taste for peers of (most likely 
similar) low socioeconomic background after controlling for the additional school resources tied to 
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the weighted student funding. They are also less concerned of school peers’ truancy behaviour – 
contrary to our earlier ‘Tiebout-mobility’ hypothesis – but seemed more selective towards schools 
with more managerial staff.  
 
Our study provides some unique insights that could aid future policymaking namely, after an external 
shock of school closure: (i) students in segregated schools prefer re-concentration to dispersal; (ii) 
school choice of students is nested upon school type or religious denomination; and (iii) peer 
composition (in terms of ethnicity and socioeconomic status), distance, truancy, school size, and 
number of school personnel (managerial, support, and administrative staff) are relevant predictors for 
school choice. Similar policy interventions in the future should account for these school choice 
determinants, i.e. by ensuring the availability of desirable school substitutes to students, during the 
policymaking process. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A: Conditional logit estimates by moving status 
Early Movers Forced Movers 
Receiving school characteristics (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
School denomination 
Public (reference) 
Islamic 1.35 0.55 3.00 1.04 -3.12 
(0.20) (0.42) (0.21) (0.43) (1.19) 
Christian 0.26 0.26 0.59 0.03 -0.38 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.25) (0.27) (0.27) 
School size 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Truancy rate (%) -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Non-western peers (%) 0.04 0.02 0.12 0.07 0.00 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Low SES peers (%) -0.03 -0.02 -0.11 -0.06 0.12 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Very low SES peers (%) -0.08 0.02 -0.29 -0.03 0.03 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of managerial staff (FTE) 0.21 -0.23 0.30 
(0.14) (0.18) (0.21) 
Number of teaching staff  (FTE) -0.05 0.07 -0.10 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Number of support staff (FTE) 0.05 0.12 0.02 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) 
Distance-to-residence -0.44 -0.49 -0.56 -0.52 -0.56 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) 
Log Likelihood -964.872 -758.149 -746.379 -623.712 -328.982 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 1945.745 1538.298 1508.759 1269.424 679.964 
Pseudo R2 0.1295 0.0957 0.6983 0.7448 0.1451 
Number of cases 209 159 466 463 75 
Number of schools 201 195 202 196 196 
Note: Model (5) refers to the ‘forced mover’ sample excluding those who had chosen to move en bloc one 
school. Aggregated variables on receiving schools calculated in years 2005 for the ‘early movers’ and 2006 for 
the ‘forced movers’. For all samples, we use 2006 weighted student funding data on parental education, 
2007/2008 CITO test scores, and 2008 school personnel data. Number of observations and school alternatives 
used in the analyses exclude those with missing values in any of the explanatory variables. The difference 
between Models (1) and (2) is driven by students who were moving between the three closed schools prior to its 
closure. 
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